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Now That the Floodgates Have Been Opened,
Why Haven't Banks Rushed Into the Certification
Authority Business?
I. INTRODUCTION
Gone are the days in which one could only transact busi-
ness in buildings made of bricks and mortar. Parties that used to
do business face-to-face with an ink signature, a handshake, and
a look in the eyes may now be many miles apart and may never
meet in person. How is that transaction possible? It is possible
with the Internet. The Internet has created countless new possi-
bilities, especially with the expansion of electronic commerce ("e-
commerce"),' which has quickly become the preferred method of
transaction for many businesses.2
When business transactions like e-commerce are carried
out over the Internet, one simple fact may thwart the growth of e-
commerce: the Internet is not secure.3 It is well-settled that in or-
1. E-commerce is the "all electronic performance of business activities." THO-
MAS J. SMEDINGHOFF, ONLINE LAW: THE SPA'S LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE
INTERNET, 512 (1996). E- commerce not only includes electronic data interchange
(EDI), but also the use of electronic mail, electronic transfer of digital content, and
electronic purchasing and payments. See id.
2. According to Forrester Research, it is estimated that in the U.S. alone, busi-
ness-to-business Internet trade is projected to soar to $1.3 trillion by 2003. See Iden-
tity Uncertainty Still Dogs E-Commerce, ELECTRONIC COM. NEws (Phillips Bus. Info.,
Potomac, MD), Dec. 6, 1999, available in LEXIS, Banking Library, PHILPS File. This
is remarkable considering that the Internet only generated $48 billion in 1999. See
Forrester Findings, Internet Commerce (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http://www.forres-
ter.com/ER/Press/ForrFind/0,1768,0,FF.html>.
3. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Elec-
tronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REV. 49, 49 (1996). As an open network, the Internet is
accessible to anyone who wants to take advantage of the fact that it is possible to
access other systems connected to the network. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The Key
to Secure Internet Commerce, OIL GLASS-CLE 201, at 2 (1998). Because the Internet
"lacks rigorous access and usage controls," it is also possible to monitor and inter-
fere with communications transmitted over the Internet. See id. Before the recent
expansion of the Internet, electronic commerce was conducted primarily over
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der for e-commerce to prosper, an elevated level of security is
needed. 4 Instead of making the security of the Internet the
method by which to provide security,5 many are supporting a
heightened level of authentication and certification of electronic
documents "to assure the reliability and enforceability of under-
lying acts." In other words, because the Internet is not secure,
parties must protect the messages they transmit via the Internet,
not the Internet itself.
Conducting business over the Internet not only presents
security challenges but also trust issues. Trust is a part of all
commercial transactions, whether the transaction originates in
the paper-based world or on the Internet.6 Traditionally, trust is
built over time, upon experience, and after parties interact with
each other repeatedly.7 But the very nature of e-commerce pre-
sents serious obstacles in building this traditional type of trust.
E-commerce often involves one-time exchanges transacted in real
time between parties who are strangers.8 The lack of traditional
paper-based methods of evidencing trust, the immediacy of elec-
tronic commerce, and the uncontrolled access to the Internet
raises many practical and legal problems in e-commerce. 9 Thus,
closed networks. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable In-
struments and Digital Signatures, 49 S.C. L. REV. 739, 742 (1998). Closed networks,
which were proprietary are being threatened by the open networks like the Inter-
net, which distribute client-server computer systems. See id.
4. Brian Smith and Paul Tufaro, To Certij or Not to Certifij? The OCC Opens the
Door to Digital Signature Certification, 24 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 813, 814 (1998). In the
commercial realm, differences in the law and the difficulty of building "trust
relationships" between parties which have had no prior dealings make reliability
and enforceability particularly important. See id.
5. See Digital Signature Trust Company for the American Bankers Association,
Digital Signatures: the Key to Information Technology Security (visited Feb. 28, 2000)
<http://www.se-com.com/secom/wp/aba.html> [hereinafter DST for ABA].
6. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff & Ruth Hill Bro, Moving With Change: Electronic
Signature Legislation As a Vehicle for Advancing E-Commerce, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COM-
PUrER & INFo. L. 723, 745 (1999). Authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation are
all legal issues one must consider when placing trust in a message. See id.
7. See Prepared Testimony ofProfessor Andrew B. Whinston, Director, Centerfor Re-
search in Electronic Commerce, Universih of Texas at Austin, Before the House Small
Business Committee, FED. NEws SERvIcE, May 26, 1999, at 2, available in LEXIS,
News Library, FEDNEW File.
8. Real time means the parties do not have the chance to "size each other up."




the anticipated growth of electronic commerce will not become a
realization until parties can place trust in the security of the mes-
sages they send via the Internet.
When the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC")1° granted authorization to Zions First National Bank of
Utah ("Zions") to establish a subsidiary to operate as a certifica-
tion authority, 11 many believed the OCC "opened the flood-
gates" to a profitable business for banks.12 A certification
authority ("CA") is a trusted third person or entity that ascertains
the identity of a person and then issues a digital certificate that
attests to the association between the person's identification and
the public key of a public/private key pair.13 The key pair is
used to create a digital signature.14 Many commentators have
stated that banks were the "best positioned players"'5 and ideally
situated to provide CA services. 16 Since the Zions approval,
10. The OCC charters, regulates and supervises more than 2,600 national
banks and 66 federal branches and agencies of foreign banks in the United States,
accounting for 56% of the nation's banking assets. Its mission is to ensure a safe,
sound and competitive national banking system that supports the citizens, commu-
nities and economy of the United States. See Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency Home Page (visited Feb. 28, 2000)
<http:// www.occ.treas.gov/AboutOCC.htm>.
11. See OCC Conditional Approval Letter 267 (an. 12,1998) [hereinafter Zions
letter].
12. See Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 813. Banks stand to make a huge profit
from this new business because CAs allow commercial parties to verify and authen-
ticate electronic signatures. See id.
13. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Electronic Contracts & Digital Signatures: An
Overview of the Law and Legislation, 564 PRACnCING L. INST. 125,149-150 (1999) [here-
inafter Smedinghoff (PLI)]. Because CAs verify a signer's identity, some analogize
them to notary publics and refer to them as "online notaries." See OCC Bulletin 99-
20, Certification Authority Systems, Guidance for Bankers and Examiners, 1,1 (May 4,
1999) [hereinafter OCC Guidance]; but see John C. Anderson & Michael L. Closen,
Document Authentication in Electronic Commerce: The Misleading Notary Public Analog
for the Digital Signature Certification Authority, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
833, 839 (1999) (contending that the notary analogy is misplaced and certification
authorities deserve a "distinct, vital, and respected position, with a heightened duty
of care owed to subscribers to adequately ensure the continued growth of secure
electronic commerce.").
14. See Smedinghoff, supra note 13, at 149.
15. See David Hallerman, Will Banks Become E-commerce Authorities? 12 BANK
TEcH. NEws, June 1,1999, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, BIS File.
16. See Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 820.
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however, banks have failed to jump onto the CA bandwagon.'7
Though the floodgates have been opened, U.S. banks have not
rushed in. 18
This paper begins with an explanation of the technology
used by CAs (Part 11)19 and explores why banks are in an ideal
position to operate as CAs (Part Ill).20 Although the issues facing
the CA industry are complex and have yet to be fully framed, this
paper attempts to identify the reasons why banks have not be-
come CAs (Part IV).21 The article concludes that despite current
obstacles, U.S. banks should become certification authorities and
continue to evolve these services with the evolution in technol-
ogy.
11. THE TECHNOLOGY USED BY CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES
A. Public Key Infrastructure ("PKI")
Public key infrastructure ("PKI") is the umbrella under
which certification authorities, digital certificates, digital signa-
tures, and the implementing hardware and software operate.22 A
PI is a "group of people who provide the necessary services to
allow public key technology users to establish the authenticity of
the public keys of the people with whom they are transacting
business." 23 PKI has become the "accepted model" by which to
17. See id. Other U.S. banks are now operating as CAs but as a part of the
worldwide company, Identrus, LLC. See OCC Conditional Approval Letter 339
(Nov. 16, 1999). The members of Identrus, LLC include Bank of America, Citibank,
ABN AMRO, Bankers Trust Company, Barclays Bank PLC, Bayerische Hypo- und
Vereinsbank AG, The Chase Manhattan Bank, Deutsche Bank, National Westmin-
ster Bank PLC, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, and Sanwa Bank. See id. at 1.
The OCC conditionally approved Indentrus to "expand activities ... to establish
and issue digital certificates." Id.
18. This paper limits its scope to American banks operating CAs in the United
States only.
19. See infra notes 23- 71 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 72- 94 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 95- 162 and accompanying text.
22. For a detailed discussion on PKIs, see generally Michael S. Baum & War-
wick Ford, Public Key Infrastructure Interoperation, 38 JuRiMETRIcsJ. 359-384 (1998).
23. See Michael J. Osty & Michael J. Pulcanio, The Liability of Certification
Authorities to Relying Third Parties, 17 J. MAmSALL J. COMPuER & INFo. L. 961, 965
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deliver and secure electronic communications via the Internet.24
CAs are a vital part of the PKI because they create an environ-
ment of trust in which parties may conduct their electronic trans-
actions using digital signatures.25 Conversely, without the
support and infrastructure of the PKI, CAs would not be able to
manage and distribute certificates.
B. Digital Signatures and Public Key Cryptography
Signatures are a "vital element in commerce." 26 In the pa-
per-based world, handwritten signatures legally bind parties and
signify authentication.27 Handwritten signatures, however, can-
not be made online.28 Consequently, their equivalent function
had to be developed for the Internet.29 Digital and electronic sig-
natures now fill the role in Cyberspace that handwritten signa-
tures fill in the paper-based world.30 These two types of
signature are different, however, and it is important to distin-
guish them. 'Digital signature' is a term for a technology-specific
type of electronic signature, known as public key cryptography.31
(1999) (citing Information Security Committee, Section of Science and Technology,
American Bar Association, Tutorial, 38 JUR]METmCS J. 243, 248 (1998)).
24. See Banks Rush to Become CAs, ELEC. PAYMENTS INT'L (Lafferty Publications,
Sidcup, Eng.), May 1998, at 9, available in LEXIS, Banking Library, LAFNLT File.
25. See Osty & Pulcanio, supra note 23, at 965.
26. Edward Kania, The ABA's Digital Signature Guidelines: An Imperfect Solution
to Digital Signatures on the Internet, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 297, 300 (1999). Signa-
tures serve four basic functions. See Kalama M. Lui-Kwan, Recent Developments in
Digital Signature Legislation and Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 463,469
(1999). First, signatures authenticate the relationship between a signer and an
agreement; second, a signature attests to the originality and authenticity of a docu-
ment; third, a signature represents the affirmative act of signers; and finally, signa-
tures provide a certain level of efficiency. See id.
27. See Intemet Law &Policy Forum, Description of Digital Signatures (visited
Feb. 28, 2000) <http://www.ilpf.org/work/ca/app6.htm> [hereinafter ILPF].
Handwritten signatures also represent authorship, acknowledgment, and assent.
See id.
28. Documents on the Internet are typed not handwritten, and are not subject
to the traditional notions of "signatures." See Kania, supra note 26, at 300. By
merely attaching one's name at the end of an electronic document does not meet the
requirement of authentication. See id.
29. See id. at 298.
30. See Simone van der Hof, Documentation in the Digital Age; Laws on Digital
Signatures, SECURrrY MGMT., April 1998, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, ABI File.
31. See Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 815. Contrary to popular belief, the
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'Electronic signature' is a broader, generic, technology-neutral
term that refers to the universe of various methods by which one
evidences an intent to be bound by or to authenticate an elec-
tronic record, including digital signatures.3 2 As between the dif-
ferent types of signatures, digital signatures are considered
superior because they are more secure,33 and with this security
comes higher comfort in doing business online. 4
The superiority of digital signature technology has made
it the most popular technology for establishing trust during se-
cure communications and e-commerce.35  The technological
combination of digital signatures and certificates is considered so
strong that "all the leading Internet security protocols have
adopted this mechanism as the vehicle of choice for authentica-
tion, privacy, and non-repudiation." 36 The digital system process
accomplishes the necessary requirements for legally-binding sig-
natures 37 and provides assurance as to the integrity and source of
digital signature is not a digitized image of a handwritten signature.
32. See id. Examples of electronic signatures include a name typed at the end
of an email message by the sender, a digitized image of a handwritten signature
attached to an electronic document, and a unique biometrics-based identifier, such
as a fingerprint or retinal scan. See Smedinghoff & Bro, supra note 6, at 730.
33. Digital signatures are more secure because the receiver of a digitally
signed communication can determine if the communication was changed after it
was digitally signed. See ILPF, supra note 27, at 1.
34. See Lui-Kwan, supra note 26, at469. "The introduction of digital signatures
would make companies feel comfortable with doing business online because they
would be less concerned that people were using, for example, false credit card and
checking account numbers or mailing addresses. Similarly consumers may feel
more comfortable doing business online because, in addition to the relative ease
with which they may conduct transactions, they would be able to rest assured that
the company they are dealing with is, in fact, the company it represents itself to be,
For both parties, enforcing contracts using digital signatures would be simpler in
the digital environment, provided that state and federal law recognizes digital sig-
natures as representations that are enforceable as handwritten signatures." Id. at
469-470.
35. Prepared Statement of Stratton D. Sclavos, President & CEO, Verisign, Inc. Be-
fore the House Committee Telecommunication, Trade and Consumer Protection Subcom-
mittee, FED. NEws SERVIc , May 21,1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW
File.
36. See id.
37. Kania, supra note 26, at 301 (citing Gary W. Fresen, V/hat Launers Should
Know about Digital Signatures, 85 ILL. B J. 170 (1997)). To be legally binding, elec-
tronic documents must satisfy the following requirements: authenticity, integrity,
and non-repudiation. See Smedinghoff (PLI), supra note 13, at 139-142. Contract law




So how do digital signatures work? The ability to digi-
tally sign a document is dependent upon Public key cryptogra-
phy.39 Although the technology is not new, it is relatively new to
the banking industry.40 Public key cryptography employs an
algorithm4' using two different keys: a public key and a private
key.42 The private key, which only the signer holds, creates a
digital signature, which in essence changes the communication
into a seemingly unintelligible form.43 The public key is widely
known and can be used by the receiver to either verify a digital
signature or return the message to its original form.44 Although
the keys are mathematically related, it is impossible to determine
what the private key is from the public key.45 Although, many
may know the public key of a given signer and use it to verify
that signer's signature, they cannot use the public key to discover
a signer's private key and use it to forge signatures.
46
38. See ILPF, supra note 27, at 1.
39. Cryptography is the branch of applied mathematics that deals with chang-
ing messages into "seemingly unintelligible forms and back again." See Digital Sig-
nature Guidelines, Legal Infrastructure for Certification Authorities and Secure Electronic
Commerce 1996 A.B.A. SEc. Sci. & TEcH. [hereinafter Digital Signature Guidelines]
(also available in (visited Mar. 7, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsgfree.html>). Public key cryptography
gets its name from the fact that one key will be published by the user but the other
will remain a secret. See Froomkin, supra note 3, at 51.
40. See OCC Guidance, supra note 13, at 25. Before public key cryptography,
the financial industry ensure confidentiality by using symmetric cryptography.
Symmetric cryptography is often called "shared secret" or "secret key" cryptogra-
phy and, unlike public key cryptography which requires two keys, uses one
mathematical function or algorithm to encrypt and decrypt a message. See id. Pub-
lic key cryptography adds a layer of security by requiring two keys. See id.
41. An algorithm is a set of rules for solving a problem in a finite number of
steps, as for finding the greatest common divisor. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UN-
ABRIDGED DICIONARY (2nd ed. 1998).
42. See Digital Signature Guidelines, Tutorial, supra note 39, at 9. Asymmetric
cryptosystem collectively describes the computer equipment and software using
two keys. See id. The use of two keys makes this system strong because mere pos-
session of one key does not provide useful information about the other key. See
Froomkin, supra note 3, at 51.
43. See Digital Signature Guidelines, Tutorial, supra note 39, at 9.
44. See id.
45. See id.; see also Lui-Kwan, supra note 26, at 457.
46. See Digital Signature Guidelines, Tutorial, supra note 40, at 10.
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It is helpful to illustrate the process used to digitally sign a
document or any other electronic information47 by using a trans-
action between A and B. The sender, A, precisely designates the
borders of the data to be signed. This is known as the message.
48
Using a hash function,49 the software on A's computer computes
a hash result unique to his message. Using A's private key, the
software then changes the hash result into a digital signature.50
The digital signature is the end result and is unique to both the
message and the private key used to create it.5l It is attached to
the message and stored or transmitted along with the message.52
How does the recipient, B, verify that the message is really
from A? B uses the same hash function that A used to create the
digital signature to compute a new hash result.53 Then using the
public key and the new hash result, B determines if the digital
signature was created using the corresponding private key and
whether the newly computed hash result matches the original
hash result, which was transformed into the digital signature
during the signing process5 4 The most attractive feature of this
technology is that a message decrypted with the public key by B
could only have been encrypted with A's private key. Therefore,
if A signs a document with his private key, B can use A's public
47. The utility of digital signatures is varied. Any information in e-commerce
a sender wanted to send securely over the Internet could be sent using digital sig-
natures. For example, contracts, images, letters, blueprints, purchase orders could
all be sent via the Internet without fear of compromising the information's legally-
binding status. See Telephone Interview with Tom Greco, Vice President of Legal
and Policy at Digital Signature Trust Company (Nov. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Greco
Interview]. Others envision digital signatures being used in moving real estate
documents "from title companies to mortgage companies to county recorders' of-
fices, or to transmit signed medical records from physicians to insurance companies
and pharmacies." Sheila R. McCann, Utah Stands Out As a Trailblazer for Digital Sig-
natures, SALT LAIT IB. Aug. 29,1999, at El.
48. See Digital Signature Guidelines, Tutorial, supra note 39, at 12.
49. The hash function is an "algorithm which creates a digital representation
or 'fingerprint' in the form of a hash value or hash result." Digital Signature Guide-
lines, Tutorial, supra note 39, at 11.




54. See id. at 13.
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key and digital signature to confirm the authenticity of the
document.55 Although this process sounds complex, A performs
the signing process and B performs the verification process with
little or no intervention.56
C. Digital Certificates and the Role of Certification Authorities
Although it is predicted that digital signature technology
could be the most promising method for achieving security in e-
commerce, its utility is limited by the ability of B to ensure the
authenticity of the public key used to verify the signature.57 Re-
turning to the transaction between A and B, without an inde-
pendent confirmation that A's message is actually from A, B does
not know if he can trust that A's public key really belongs to A.
C, an impostor, could have sent B his public key, purporting that
it belongs to A. This transaction needs a reliable third party to
not only register the public keys of the parties but to also guaran-
tee the accuracy of the identification of the parties. The CA is this
reliable third party.
The CA fills this need by issuing digital certificates that at-
test to some fact about the subscriber, the subject of the certifi-
cate.58 The digital certificate is a computer-based record that
contains information valuable in a commercial transaction be-
tween strangers. Information such as the identity of the issuing
CA, the name, identity and some attribute of the subscriber, the
55. See Lui-Kwan, supra note 26, at 467; see Winn, supra note 3, at 764.
56. Digital signature software can be purchased or downloaded onto the
sender's computer. See DST for ABA, supra note 5. To sign an electronic docu-
ment, the user simply clicks "sign" on the computer toolbar. See id. The software
retrieves his private key from wherever it is stored (the computer hard drive or
floppy disk) and the document is signed. See id. The recipient clicks "verify" on his
computer toolbar and the appropriate public key is retrieved from wherever it is
stored (on the recipient's hard drive or an online public key repository). One bank
employee noted that the technology is essentially invisible to the user. "It has be-
come routine for us already," she notes. Hallerman, supra note 15; see McCann,
supra note 47, at El (quoting First Security Bank employee).
57. See Froomkin, supra note 3, at 54.
58. See Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 817. This is necessary because the pub-
lic key and private key pair is merely a pair of numbers and has no intrinsic rela-
tionship with any one particular person. See id.
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subscriber's public key, and the digital signature of the CA, are
included in digital certificates. 59 The primary function of the cer-
tificate is to bind a key with a particular subscriber.60
The subscriber must provide the CA with evidence of
identity, such as a driver's license, passport, or any other proof
required by the CA.6 The subscriber must then demonstrate that
he holds the private key corresponding to the public key (with-
out disclosing the private key).62 These steps may differ from CA
to CA, depending on a number of factors, including the type or
level of certificate being offered by the CA.P Once the CA has
verified the association between an identified person or entity
and the public key, it issues a digital certificate.64
The CA digitally signs the certificate to assure both the
message and identity authenticity of the certificate.65 The sub-
scriber may publish a certificate in an online, publicly accessible
repository66 to make it available to third parties that might want
to communicate with the subscriber.67 Repositories also house
helpful information concerning certificates that have been re-
59. See Froomkin, supra note 3, at 58.
60. See DST for ABA, supra note 5. A subscriber is defined as the subject of a
certificate that holds the private key that corresponds to the public key listed in the
certificate. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 39, at 63. See also Froomkin,
supra note 3, at 57-64 (identifying different types of certificates and their purpose in
identification).
61. See Smedinhoff (PLI), supra note 13, at 149.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 150.
65. But how does the relying party know the CA that signed the certificate is a
valid CA? The CA's digital signature can be verified using the public key of the CA
listed in another certificate by another CA. See Froomkin, supra note 3, at 56. This
creates a hierarchy of CAs called a "certificate chain." See id. At the root of the hi-
erarchy is the root certificate. See id. But how does one know the root CA is valid?
One solution to this problem contemplates a governmental role in the certifying the
keys of CAs. See id. The root CA would belong to a state or federal agency, and the
few CAs that meet state licensing requirements would be rewarded with govern-
mental certification of their root keys. See id. These CAs would then certify the root
keys of organizations that wished to manage their own certificates. See id.
66. A repository is a "database of active digital certificates for a CA system"
OCC Guidance, supra note 13, at 8.
67. See Digital Signature Guidelines, Tutorial, supra note 39, at 19; see DST for
ABA, supra note 5.
TECHNOLOGY
voked or suspended due to lost or expired private keys.68 Public
access to the status of digital certificates informs relying parties
so they may determine whether or not they should rely on com-
munications digitally signed with a certain key.69
Digital certificates provide the necessary security for elec-
tronic transactions, but they "do not by themselves, establish a
reason that they should be relied upon... The trust that is placed
in a certificate is, in the end, a function of who has issued the cer-
tificate and that issuer's willingness to stand behind it."70 It is at
this point that bank involvement becomes important.
Il. WHY BANKS AS CAs?
A. The Attributes of Banks That Make Them Ideal CAs
Many argue that the certification authority role should be
filled by banks. The strongest argument for bank involvement in
the CA business is the fact that banks are trusted entities. They
are already known as providers of trust in commercial transac-
tions because they have "long played the role as trusted interme-
diaries".71  Banks have "distinctive risk-reducing features"
including high capital assets, sophisticated networks, and state-
of-the-art technology implementations, which collectively endow
banks with a higher level of trust.7 2 Banks also have the financial
strength to enter into a new industry.7 3
Many larger banks have the "technical expertise" needed
68. See DST for ABA, supra note 5.
69. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Certification Authority Liability Analysis, AM.
BANKERS ASS'N, (1998) [hereinafter ABA Liability Analysis].
70. Hallerman, supra note 15 (quoting ABAecom, a subsidiary of the American
Bankers Association).
71. OCC News Release 98-4, OCC Approves a National Bank to Certifij Digital
Signatures Uan. 13, 1998) (quoting Eugene Ludwig, former Comptroller of the Cur-
rency).
72. Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 820. Some believe that banks are in a bet-
ter position than technology companies to provide CA service because banks are
more responsible. See Hallerman, supra note 15.
73. See Paul Corwin, The Virtual Dotted Line: Understanding Digital Signatures,
16 NO. 4 BANKING PoL'Y REP. 1, 16 (1997).
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to operate a CA due to the sudden growth of e-commerce enter-
prises.74 These experiences with e-commerce would make the
transition into the CA business an easy one.75 Those banks that
employ a significant amount of technology may have the neces-
sary infrastructure to manage and oversee the risks accompany-
ing CA business.76 Furthermore, to fill their obligation to "know
their customers", banks have implemented "stringent internal
control policies, requiring them to obtain records containing in-
formation concerning the true identity of persons conducting fi-
nancial transactions".77
Operating a certification business could confer great bene-
fits and profits for banks and provide a new service to their cus-
tomers.78 Not only does a CA system provide potentially
profitable opportunities for banks to expand their relationships
with business customers,79 but banks can shift their dominance in
the physical payment infrastructure over to the Internet.80 In ad-
dition, with the evolution of the electronic payment systems, the
ability to act as a CA for digital signature technology is expected
to be vital to their role in electronic payments.81 As the digital
signature infrastructure grows, financial institutions will not only
benefit from the growth of electronic commerce but also from the
74. See Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 820.
75. See id. at 814. Banks are familiar with and are experts in "cryptography
and electronic data exchange, recordkeeping, data security, customer privacy, and
the duties as a fiduciary." Corwin, supra note 74, at 16.
76. See Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 820.
77. Id. at 820.
78. See Zions letter, supra note 11, at 35. The OCC notes that a businesses in-
volving PC Banking, such as operating as a CA, can expand a bank's geographic
reach, increase customer convenience, and reduce transaction costs. See OCC Bulle-
tin 98-38, Technology Risk Management: PC Banking, Guidance for Bankers and Examin-
ers, Aug. 24,1998 [hereinafter OCC PC Guidance].
79. See Hallerman, supra note 15.
80. See Banks Scent Opportunities in Secure E-commerce, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS
INT'L, Apr. 1,1999, available in 1999 WL 11541366.
81. Zions letter, supra note 11, at 35. The OCC expects that some form of elec-
tronic system will be needed for the electronic checking system, and a bank-based
system of digital signature certificates could provide an essential foundation. See id.
Digital signature technology could also be used to authenticate letters of credit or
any other situation where remote clients need to be authenticated by a server (i.e.
remote banking and Internet-based cash management systems). See id.
[Vol. 4
TECHNOLOGY
"ability to participate directly in the business functions related to
issuing and storing digital certificates."
82
Although several private non-bank CAs are currently in
operation,83 banks have several advantages over them. Notwith-
standing the financial strength and reputation for trustworthi-
ness, another major advantage is that banks are regulated by the
OCC. Banks will be required to have certain standards of secu-
rity and levels of assurance,84 which non-regulated CAs are not
required to have.85 This makes it easier for banks to sell trust.
B. The Beginning of Bank Involvement: The Zions Letter
In January 1998, the OCC issued a conditional approval to
Zions First National Bank ("Zions") to establish Digital Signature
Trust Company ("DST").86 DST is a subsidiary of Zions that will
act as a CA and public key repository.8 7 This approval brought
certification activities to the attention of the banking industry and
marked the beginning of bank involvement in the CA business.
In the Zions letter, the OCC concluded that the CA activities pro-
posed by Zions had many "functional similarities" to already
recognized banking activities such as notarial and other authenti-
cation services.88 Because of this similarity, the OCC condition-
82. See Corwin, supra note 73, at 17. With the experience they already have in
storing information, banks could also consider serving as a repository. See id. See
also Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 825.
83. Several private commercial CAs are currently operating. See Hallerman,
supra note 15. Among them are Verisign, Inc., GTE Cybertrust, CertCo, L.L.C, and
Entrust Technologies, Inc.
84. See Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 820.
85. See Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 820.
86. "DST helps government and industry clients benefit from savings and ser-
vice opportunities offered by the Internet through providing trusted, PKI-based
digital certificate services and secure electronic commerce solutions." Digital Signa-
hre Trust Wins U.S. Department of Defense Contract to Issue Digital Certificates, PR
NEwswmE, Sept. 22, 1999, available in LEXIS, Banking Library, PRNEWS File. DST
was previously licensed by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code of
the Utah Department of Commerce. See Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 822.
87. See Zions letter, supra note 11, at 1.
88. See id. at 23. Many banks have the power to provide notary services with
the OCC's approval. See id. at 22. The OCC also noted the similarities between CA
services and the established banking service of providing a letter of reference or
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ally approved Zions' application.
The Zions letter is extremely important for many reasons.
It is the "first explicit grant of authority by a federal agency to
national banks to engage in certification activities". 89 The letter's
detailed and thorough analysis leaves little doubt that national
banks may offer CA services.90 Second, the letter highlights the
OCC's willingness to allow the banking industry to evolve with
technology.91 Third, it establishes guidance for banks wanting to
get involved in e-commerce as they attempt to maximize the po-
sition of trust they have with their customers.92 The Zions letter
will ensure that banks maintain high standards of safety, secu-
rity, and privacy. 93
IV. WHY BANKS ARE NOT BECOMING CAs
Notwithstanding the prediction that the Zions letter
would "open the floodgates" to the CA business,94 Zions contin-
ues to be one of the few banks operating a subsidiary as a CA.95
Despite the inherent qualities of the banking industry that make
it suitable to provide this trust to the market, they have been ex-
tremely reluctant to do so. No one reason fully explains banks'
reluctance to enter the CA business, but this paper highlights
some of the risks and issues a bank faces once it decides to oper-
ate a CA as a subsidiary or provide CA services itself. The com-
bination of all these factors may explain why banks are reacting
so slowly to this new industry.
introduction. See id. at 23.
89. Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 824.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 814
92. See id. The Zions letter serves as a guide for other applicants who will seek
to expand their traditional banking services to keep up with technology. See id. The
Zions letter, however, is not without its weaknesses. The guidelines are closely tied
to the facts specific to Zions and DST, which may reduce the precedential value for
banks not so situated. See id. For example, the OCC's approval is conditioned upon
several expressed and implied representations made by DST and Zions and other
banks may be reluctant to apply the recommendations to their bank. See id. at 826.
93. See id. at 820.
94. See id. at 813.
95. Bank of America and Wells Fargo are offering CA services to their corpo-




Risks and uncertainty are involved with any new indus-
try. The nature of the CA business makes this statement particu-
larly true. Stepping into the middle of a commercial transaction
and guaranteeing the identities of the parties demands that one
take on risks. Recognizing the need for guidance in how to deal
with such risks, the OCC issued basic guidelines for banks con-
sidering operating or currently operating CAs in 1999.96 So as
not to retard the growth of the "immature industry", the guide-
lines are broad.97 Because the operational elements of a CA sys-
tem are similar to that of a PC banking system, the OCC advised
banks to use the CA guidelines in conjunction with the PC Bank-
ing Guidelines to identify all the risks involved in this new busi-
ness.98
So what are the risks to banks and how do they arise? Be-
cause CA services are based on emerging technology, a CA ex-
poses a bank to strategic, reputation, and transaction risks.99
These risks are encountered when banks manage and issue digi-
tal certificates. 0 To issue a digital certificate, a CA must verify
subscribers' identities; determine the appropriate content of the
certificates; create, distribute, and ensure acceptance of digital
certificates; and ensure internal activity. 10 Managing a certificate
involves consumer disclosure, subscriber service and support,
suspending and revoking certificates, and processing the re-
96. See OCC Guidance, supra note 13, at 1. The Guidelines were written to
help bankers make informed decisions about the CA business. See id.
97. See E.W., Digital Signatures Guidance, At Last, Arrives, FIN. MODERNIZATION
REP. (Am. Banker-Bond Buyer, New York, N.Y.), May 10,1999, at 1.
98. See OCC PC Guidance, supra note 78, at 1. The OCC defines PC Banking
as computer hardware, software, and telecommunication systems that enable retail
customers to access both specific account and general bank information on bank
products and services through personal computers (PC). See id. The bank's net-
work design and telecommunication links may include the use of private networks
(i.e. direct dial-in using leased or dedicated telephone lines) or public networks (i.e.
the Internet). See id.
99. See id. at 2.
100. See id.
101. See OCC Guidance, supra note 13, at 11.
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quests of relying parties.102
With each step of the CA process, a bank exposes itself to
complex risk issues. For example, if the CA falsely or inaccu-
rately identifies a subscriber, it may suffer financial loss or ex-
pose itself to legal action.103 Similarly, if a CA does not properly
protect its own signature with internal security, fraudulent cer-
tificates could be distributed in the CA's name, resulting in pos-
sible fraud losses and affecting legitimate subscribers or relying
parties.Y4
B. Liability
Early on, industry participants were concerned that the un-
certain exposure to liability would forestall the emergence of
commercial CAs.105 Currently state statutes provide the rules
and regulations for banks acting as CAs, and many attempt to
deal with liability issues.06 In 1998, the American Bankers Asso-
ciation ("ABA") commissioned a report on CA liability.107 From
this report, five primary areas of potential liability were analyzed
in detail: negligent misrepresentation, contract liability, statutory
liability, intellectual property infringement, and liability for the
conduct of others105 It is outside the purview of this paper to de-
tail the various aspects of each area of liability, but a brief de-
scription of the above-referenced areas is warranted.
1. Tort Liability- Negligent Misrepresentation
Because a CA is in the business of providing information
102. See id. at 17.
103. See id. at 15-16.
104. See id. at 15.
105. See C. Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners: Digital Signature Laws
and the Electronic Commerce Marketplace, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv 1225,1230 (1997).
106. See Liability Analysis, supra note 69, at 1.
107. See id.
108. See id. The report does not purport to analyze all the potential areas of li-
ability. See id. Other areas of potential liability not discussed include antitrust, in-




that others will rely upon, the failure of the CA to exercise rea-
sonable care could expose it to liability for the tort of negligent
misrepresentation, to the extent that information is wrong or that
parties rely to their detriment.109 The scope of the CA's liability
for negligent misrepresentation depends on whether the CA has
a legal duty, and if it does, to whom the duty is owed.10 Al-
though negligent misrepresentation creates a duty to exercise
reasonable care to verify facts, it does not make the CA a guaran-
tor of the information provided."' Therefore, the CA is only li-
able if the error made is because of its own negligence. 112 The
tort claims for negligent misrepresentation may also be limited
by the "economic loss doctrine", which prohibits recovery in tort
for product defect claims when the loss is purely economic.1
3
2. Contract Liability
The applicable law dictates which contractual and war-
ranty obligations will exist for a CA.114 Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") governs transactions in goods, while
the common law applies to service transactions and contracts
dealing specifically with information.1 5 One must consider all
the activities a CA is involved in to determine if contract or
common law applies.116 This categorization is important because
the result determines which law a court will apply in interpreting
the transaction, and one body of law may be more favorable than
the other body.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 2.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 44 (citing Reeder R. Fox and Patrick J. Loftus, Riding the Choppy
Waters of East River: Economic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 260, 260
(1997)).
114. See id. at 3.
115. See id. at 3. If a transaction involves both the sale of goods and the provi-
sion of services, the jurisdiction determines whether the UCC or the common law
applies. See id. at 54. The majority of courts apply the "predominant factor test" to
determine if the transaction is a service or sale of good. See id.
116. See id. at 55.
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3. Statutory Liability
Oftentimes statutes deal with the apportionment of liability
for CAs. While operating under such a statute and subsequent
enabling regulations, different liability issues may arise.11 7 Some
of the states that have enacted digital signature legislation deal
specifically with CAs and the issue of liability." 8 Others, al-
though they may consider the concept of a certification authority,
do not specifically deal with the statutory liabilities.11 9 CAs
should also determine if federal or international laws would af-
fect their services. 120
4. Intellectual Property Infringement
Intellectual property laws protect rights "in intangible sub-
ject matters such as inventions and trademarks", including but
not limited to patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and related
rights emerging under unfair competition and privacy. 121 "De-
pending on the right infringed, remedies for infringement may
include damages, profits, punitive damages, attorney's fees and
injunctions against further infringement". 122 Each of these areas
present challenges in the law for CAs.
5. Liability for the Conduct of Others
Most of the injuries that result from CA activities will more
than likely come from the CA's employees, contractors, subscrib-
ers, and other third parties, rather than the corporate persona of
117. See id.
118. For example, Utah's digital signature legislation dealt specifically with li-
ability apportionment. See id. at 88; see also infra notes 145-160 and accompanying
text
119. See id. at 88.
120. See id.




the CA itself.123 Therefore, the CA "should be aware that it may
be legally accountable for the use (and misuse) of its CA services
by CA employees and contractors."124
C. Costs
The cost to build the necessary components of a PKI is an-
other factor that may discourage banks from deciding to operate
a CA. "The cost structure of technology requires tremendous in-
vestment in the infrastructure to make it possible to efficiently
process information and to handle heavy traffic and deliver satis-
factory service."'25 Some of the financial requirements of a net-
work security solution include "high fixed costs, long
implementation timeline[s], economies of scale, and ongoing
support costs."126 A 1998 study by GIGA Information Group re-
vealed that support costs for a five-year long project are between
$4.2 and $9.8 million for a 20,000 Certificate PKI, with full life cy-
cle management.127
Costs as great as these create a "chicken-and-egg" rid-
dle. 28 The PKI must be built, but one must find justification for
the building of the infrastructure. 129 Even if the creation of CAs
is a requirement before the projections of growth in e-commerce
become reality, the ratio of initial investment costs to the value of
digital transactions may be a factor in preventing this growth
from becoming a reality.130 But once the infrastructure is built,
123. See id. at 7. Although not directly responsible, the CA could be liable "un-
der the theories of (a) vicarious liability, (b) agency, (c) contributory infringement,
(d) corporate negligence, and (e) liability for the criminal conduct of a third party."
Id.
124. Id. at 8.
125. Whinston, supra note 7.
126. Digital Signature Trust Company, Outsourced CA Services (visited Feb. 28,
2000) <http://www.digsigtrust.com/why.html>. DST offers full service CA out-
sourcing. See id.
127. See id. This, of course, varies according to PKI software vendor, internal
business requirements, existing infrastructure, and specific organization. See id.
128. See Corwin, supra note 73, at 17.
129. See Greco Interview, supra note 47.
130. See id.
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the cost decreases with the number of products offered. 131 The
few banks participating in the CA business have turned to out-
sourcing some of the CA functions to help reduce these costs.132
D. Potential Profit: How Much Can Banks Make From CA Ser-
vices?
This paper has assumed that since CAs are necessary for a
viable e-commerce, once banks decide to operate as CAs, the pro-
jections of the success of e-commerce will lead to enormous prof-
its for banks. Some experts are skeptical of the promises for
profit because it remains unclear "if this [CA] concept will de-
velop into a viable commercial service."' 33 A commercial equiva-
lent to CA services does not currently exist, and while
proponents have been confident that the need for security on the
Internet would trigger a demand for CA among commercial par-
ties, there is no precedent to support operating an identification
service for profit.134 As of now, not many applications for digital
signatures exist. 35
The function of digital certificates as a "uniform identifica-
tion in cyberspace" has been compared more to the ministerial
functions performed by government officials while conducting
official business, rather than a service commercial parties rely on
to transact with strangers. 36 Furthermore, commercial parties
commonly rely on letters of credit services offered by banks,
which not only attest to the identity of the parties, but also their
creditworthiness. Thus, the functions that a CA would perform
are redundant.137
131. See Whinston, supra note 7.
132. See Hallerman, supra note 15.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See Greco Interview, supra note 47.
136. See Winn, supra note 3, at 772. The CA business model as discussed by
Winn is that described in the Digital Signature Guidelines released by the ABA. See





Despite the above suggestions, the potential for profit
from CA services is still an incentive. Even if the cost per trans-
action is low, the mere number of transactions a CA would per-
form could result in substantial financial benefits.138 In addition,
banks operating CAs could determine the pricing structure that
would be the most financially beneficial to them. 139 Digital cer-
tificates could also be forging into new territory in the security
industry by replacing the current password schemes,140 and cre-
ating another potential profit producing product. In some in-
stances, digital certificates could replace multiple passwords with
a single sign-on.141 This would decrease password administration
costs and nearly justify the costs of developing PI technology 42
E. Knowledge
The fact that the banking industry is still learning about
digital signature technology and its possibilities may add more
insight into this issue. Banks are still in the "typical technology
adoption cycle," 143 and until they understand the technology and
the business benefit, they will not employ it. Insiders suspect
that those in the legal and medical professions will be the first to
seize and utilize digital signature technology because they face
the most liability if the work they display on cyberspace is not
secure.144
138. Hallerman, supra note 15.
139. Zions, for example, prices digital signature services based on the type of
service: transactions, consulting-type services, or the delivery of turnkey solutions
to the user. See Zions: Melding Tradition and Innovation, FIN. MODERNIZATION REP.
(Am. Banker-Bond Buyer, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1, 1999, at 1, available in LEXIS,
Banking Library, ABBB File. The fee could be adjusted for those customers who do
a high volume of business. See id.
140. See Hallerman, supra note 15. When dealing with more serious transac-
tions, more security is required. Id As of now, passwords do not provide that higher
level of security. See id. Digital certificates are also easier to use and more secure
than passwords. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See Hallerman, supra note 15.
144. See McCann, supra note 47, at El.
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F. State Legislation
State legislation plays a significant role in the potential
growth of CAs. The "duties and liabilities imposed upon CAs
under United States law are unclear", as might be expected due
to the complete absence of federal statutes, case law, and the rela-
tively small number of functioning CAs.145 The most basic issue
to be addressed by e-commerce legislation is enforceability of e-
commerce transactions. 146
Recognizing the problems posed by e-commerce legisla-
tion, almost every state has enacted some sort of e-commerce or
digital signature legislation,147 which ultimately affects the plight
of CAs. States have taken various approaches to this legislation,
ranging from minimal to very formal and highly regulatory. 48
Even though states are responding to the sudden emergence of
digital signature technology by enacting legislation, this state-by-
state approach makes it more difficult and cumbersome for oper-
ating CAs.
A brief examination of two state statutes concerning the
licensing of CAs, Utah and North Carolina, demonstrates the dis-
crepancies that banks will find in statutes. The Utah Digital Sig-
nature Act, 149 which licensed DST Company, was the first
comprehensive digital signature legislation and is the "most pre-
scriptive" legislation thus far passed.150 The Act imposes strict
requirements on CAs by specifying what constitutes as adequate
record-keeping and detailing procedures CAs must follow when
they issue, revoke or suspend a digital signature certificate.' 5'
The Act adopted a voluntary licensing procedure for CAs. 5 2
145. Smith & Tufaro, supra note 4, at 818.
146. See Smedinghoff & Bro, supra note 6, at 726.
147. The Chicago law firm McBride, Baker, and Coles provides a comprehen-
sive summary of enacted and pending digital signature state legislation at
<http://www.mbc.com/ecommerce/legis/tale01.html> (visited Feb. 28,2000).
148. See Smedinghoff & Bro, supra note 6, at 728.
149. Utah Code Ann. § § 46-3-101 - 46-3-544 (1999) [hereinafter the "Act"].
150. See Liability Analysis, supra note 69, at 88.
151. Smith and Tufaro, supra note 4, at 819.
152. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201 (1999).
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Utah apportioned liability such that licensing a CA substantially
decreases the amount of liability shouldered by the CA. More
specifically, a licensed CA in Utah enjoys a liability safe harbor,15 3
protection from reliance on a forged digital signature,154 a cap on
liability,155 and a limit on compensatory damages. 56
In 1998, North Carolina passed the Electronic Commerce
Act 5 7 to "facilitate electronic commerce with public agencies and
regulate the application of electronic signatures when used in
commerce with public agencies." 158 North Carolina has a manda-
tory licensing process, requiring CAs to be licensed by the Secre-
tary of State. 59 The statute, unlike the Utah Act, does not set
forth any standards by which the CA is to operate. 160 It leaves
that task to the Secretary of State.161 But if the Secretary of State
for North Carolina decides to require substantially different regu-
lations than the Utah statute, a CA faces the difficulty of comply-
ing with both statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Though the OCC has paved the way for banks to operate
as certification authorities, it is still unclear whether banks will
"jump on the bandwagon" as predicted. Although many techno-
logical and liability issues are currently a part of the reality of the
certification business, the demands of e-commerce and the need
for more security will push banks reluctantly into the industry.
153. § 46-3-309.
154. § 46-3-309(2)(a). The CA must comply with all material requirements of
the Act. Id.
155. Id. The CA shall not be liable in excess of the recommended reliance limit
for either a loss caused by reliance on a misrepresentation in the certificate or for
failure to comply with the Act's guidelines for issuing certificates. Id.
156. § 46-3-309(2)(c). This limit does not include damage for lost profits or for
pain and suffering. § 46-3-309(2)(c)(iii).




161. See id. These standards may include, but are not limited to technical,
physical, procedural and personnel security controls, repository obligations, and
financial responsibility standards. See id
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The best option for banks considering operating a CA is to
create a subsidiary and outsource the technology aspects. This
strategy allows banks to limit their liability, decrease the cost of
building the PKI infrastructure, minimize the necessity to under-
stand and know the technology while providing this service to its
customers. The bank could still brand the product as its own.
162
As industry forerunners, the American Bankers Association
("ABA") 63 has partnered with DST to do just that. In September
1998, DST partnered with the ABA to create the subsidiary
ABAecom.1M DST will provide ABAecom with CA services, in-
cluding digital certificates, PKI, and CA outsourcing and consult-
ing for ABA-members.165 ABAecom's first product is SiteCertain,
an interactive seal on the member bank's Web site that connects
customers to ABAecom's secure online database. 166 ABAecom,
with DST performing the PKI services, serves as the CA for Site-
Certain. This way, the bank brands the CA service and decides
who is certified, while the provider runs the PK. 67
The mere fact that banks may make money from the CA
enterprise will not be the only factor that motivates mass bank
involvement. The opportunity to take advantage of new tech-
162. See OCC Guidance, supra note 13, at 11. The OCC projected that continued
emphasis on PC banking would force a bank to rely on service providers and soft-
ware vendors to design, implement, and manage these systems. See OCC PC Guid-
ance, supra note 79, at 7. The extent to which banks decide to do this will affect the
extent of the bank's actual involvement and risk. See id.
163. "The ABA brings together all categories of banking institutions to best
represent the interests of this rapidly changing industry. Its membership-which
includes community, regional, and money-center banks and holding companies, as
well as savings associations, trust companies, and savings banks makes ABA the
largest banking trade association in the country." DST for ABA, supra note 5.
164. See Hallerman, supra note 15. ABAecom's goal is to help banks build
stronger relationships with their customers and increase usage of their online
products by issuing digital signatures. PR NEWSWME, September 28,1998.
165. See ABA Launches Electronic Commerce Subsidiary; ABAecom Will Serve As
Catalyst for Secure Online Transactions, Sept. 28, 1999, available in LEXIS, Banking
Library, PRNEWS File.
166. See id.
167. Credit card company Visa has partnered with VeriSign, Inc. to offer Secure
Socket layer (SSL) certificates to large banks that manage the merchant accounts of
businesses and handle their payments (so-called acquiring banks). See Visa Helps




nology that could revolutionize the banking industry is an even
better motive. The most exciting feature of PKI technology is the
fact that banks will have the ability to send blue prints, purchase
orders, contracts, and other electronic data securely over the
Internet. This capability would change not only how banks do
business but also with whom they do business.168 Banks have the
unique opportunity to provide the trust and security needed for
e-commerce, while utilizing cutting edge technology. Even
though they have not "jumped on the bandwagon," they should.
TARA C. HOGAN
168. See Greco telephone interview, supra note 47.
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